Introduction
Context of the Iraqi Parliamentary elections in November 2025
Iraq held its sixth parliamentary elections since 2003 on November 11, 2025, to elect 329 members
to the Council of Representatives. This report examines hate speech and TFGBV directed at women
candidates during Iraq’s 2025 elections, situating these dynamics within the broader landscape of
women’s participation and their representation in the resulting parliament. In the November 2025
elections 2,248 women ran for office, representing 30% of all candidates, the highest proportion in
Iraq's electoral history. However, only 84 women secured parliamentary seats, representing 25.5%
of the total, which was just one seat above the constitutional minimum quota of 83 seats. Of these
84 women, only 25 secured their positions through direct electoral votes, while the remaining 59
entered parliament through the quota mechanism. This marks a significant decline from the 2021
parliament, where women held 96 seats (29% of the chamber), with 53 winning through direct
electoral votes. 3
In Iraq’s post-2003 political system, a longstanding power-sharing agreement emerged between the
country’s major ethno-sectarian groups, known locally as muhasasa.4 Under this informal
agreement, the largely ceremonial presidency is reserved for a Kurdish politician, the premiership
falls to the Shia Arab bloc, while the speakership of parliament is allocated to a Sunni Arab
politician.5 Although this arrangement is not explicitly mandated by the Iraqi Constitution, it has
been reaffirmed by successive government formation processes since 2005 and is widely observed
as a mechanism to balance political authority among the country’s main communities.
Electoral competition has been largely shaped by established parties and alliances operating within
Iraq’s power-sharing framework. Prominent Shia-led blocs include the State of Law Coalition, the
Fatah Alliance, and actors associated with the Coordination Framework. On the Sunni side,
competition features parties and alliances such as the Taqaddum Party, the Azm Alliance, and other
regional Sunni lists. Kurdish political representation has remained dominated by the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), alongside smaller Kurdish parties.
Together, these actors’ structure electoral competition largely along ethno-sectarian and bloc-based
lines, limiting spaces for new or non-traditional political entities. New or alternative political actors
have faced structural and procedural constraints in entering the electoral arena. Of particular note is
the women-led Al-Mawada Feminist Party formally established on 26 July 2025.6 Though its
founding generated considerable political and digital attention, the party was unable to
participate in the elections, having been established too close to the electoral deadlines to
meet registration requirements.
3
The New Arab. (2025, December 11). Iraq's women MPs hold more seats but little sway.
https://perma.cc/Z5TB-T3RU; Alhurra. (2025, December 1). Why Did Women's Seats Decline in the Iraqi
Parliament? https://perma.cc/R4NX-72G5
4
The muhasasa or ethno-sectarian quota system epitomises this. It is predicated on pigeonholing people into
sectarian categories: Sunni, Shi'a, or Kurdish, and so forth. Campaign posters feature religious, tribal and
ethnic symbols rather than detailed policy platforms to spur people to vote. Thus, citizens are hailed by the
parties' propaganda to protect their share of power rather than selecting the righteous candidates into the
right place. This procedure of manipulating the voters reproduces the very system that fragments the
wounded nation. https://www.researchgate.net/topic/Elections
5
The Arab Weekly. (2025, December 30). Iraqi parliament elects new speaker in first step towards picking
country’s leadership [Web page]. The Arab Weekly. https://perma.cc/53HP-6KLZ
6
INSM for Digital Rights. (2025). الرقم يف العراق مع تأسيس حزب نسوي
[ !كيف تعاىط الفضاءWeb page]. INSM for Digital
ي
Rights. https://insm-iq.org/?p=2044
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