DW Akademie Study Safer platforms, stronger participation
Nearly 75 percent of women journalists
surveyed by UNESCO have faced online
violence, and one in four received
physical or death threats. As AI amplifies
abuse through deepfakes, doxxing, and
harassment.
According to the UN 2022 study, The Chilling, “Nearly
75 percent of women journalists surveyed by UNESCO
have faced online violence, and one in four received physical or death threats. As AI amplifies abuse through deepfakes, doxxing, and harassment”. The report zooms in on
GBVO faced by Arab journalists and particularly those in
conflict areas and war zones in which women journalists’
exposure to GBV is much heightened.
3.2 GBVO in the Syrian
media and information
landscape
Since the 2011 uprising, Syria’s political, economic, and
social realities have been marked by relentless instability, uprisings, armed confrontations, displacement, sieges,
proxy wars, and even natural disasters like earthquakes.
The media sphere reflects this turbulence at every turn.
Each time a new faction asserted control over a territory,
Syrians found themselves waiting anxiously to learn the
rules of the new “authorities”: whether freedom of expression would be tolerated, curtailed, or reshaped entirely.
For decades, Syrians lived under a regime that normalized
censorship and repression, where violations of human
rights were routine and media served as an arm of the
state. Then, in December 2024, the seemingly immovable regime collapsed as Bashar al‑Assad fled to Russia, ending a dynasty many believed eternal. The fall of
the regime, whether celebrated or met with skepticism,
marked a rupture in Syria’s media history as much as in its
politics. Suddenly, outlets long exiled began reopening
offices in Damascus, international agencies returned, and
journalists tested the boundaries of a freer press (Freedom House, 2025; Index on Censorship, 2025). “Outlets
that once operated from exile or from areas outside
regime control have re‑emerged inside Syria, reclaiming
a visible role in public life. Stations and platforms such
as Radio Rozana, Enab Baladi, Al Joumhouria and Aks
al Seir now attract large followings, while Qatar‑linked
broadcasters like Syria TV and Al Jazeera continue to
shape the national conversation. International news
organizations have largely re-established a presence in
Damascus since the regime’s collapse, and even the former state propaganda outlet, SANA, has revised its editorial posture to reflect the priorities of the new authorities”
(Reporters Without Borders, 2025).
With the fall of the regime, many Syrians dared to imagine
a more open media environment and landscape that gives
them their right to freely express themselves and hold
the government to account. Yet, it appears that this hope
is fragile as civil society actors are witnessing violations
mirroring the violations of the old regime as the practices
of censorship, intimidation and information control they
thought consigned to the past have resurfaced under the
new authorities. This, coupled with legal ambiguity, political instability and pockets of sectarian armed conflict
across the country, adds fuel to the fire.
“According to CPJ, in 2025 a clear pattern of threats
against journalists emerged: reporters were killed and
wounded while covering sectarian clashes and other
outbreaks of violence, including the confirmed killing of
a photojournalist in Suwayda in July; at the same time
CPJ’s alerts and features documented widespread harassment and intimidation — journalists chased, detained, shot
at, and pressured by militias, armed groups and foreign
forces operating in or near Syrian territory — creating a
pervasive climate of fear; and access to information was
routinely obstructed, with journalists blocked from conflict
zones, equipment damaged or confiscated, and reporting
prevented or curtailed, all of which severely undermined
independent coverage and accountability” (Committee to
Protect Journalists, 2025).
Syria’s information environment is defined by a combination of fragmented media authority, uneven connectivity,
and heavy dependence on a small number of social and
messaging platforms for news, debate, and community
interaction. At the start of 2025, Syria had an estimated
9.01 million internet users (around 35.8 percent of the
population), alongside widespread reliance on mobile
connectivity, with approximately 19.5 million cellular
mobile connections (equivalent to 77.6 percent of the
population). These figures reflect both expansion in
connectivity and persistent exclusion: a significant proportion of Syrians remain offline, while those who are connected often experience constrained bandwidth, limited
device security, and inconsistent access to safe digital
literacy support (Data Reportal, 2025). In this context,
online spaces have become disproportionately influential
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