DW Akademie Study Safer platforms, stronger participation
threats, blackmail attempts, or coordinated pile-ons.
Relevant examples from the interview scan are closing
or deactivating accounts, stopping posting, avoiding
appearing on public pages, or stepping back from media/
advocacy visibility to protect family relationships and
reduce offline spillovers. A media KII who supports GBVO
survivors noted that women activists can withdraw from
both digital and public life after attacks, indicating that for
some women, coping can indeed entail reducing public
profile in ways that may directly affect their work and role
as public figures.
Women’s coping strategies described across the qualitative findings from KIIs, IDIs and FGDs can be grouped into
four practical clusters:
1.
However, withdrawal was not the only pattern. Other
women described partial disengagement rather than quitting: limiting interaction to trusted circles, avoiding highrisk topics (politics/sectarian issues), changing how they
engage (lurking rather than posting), and shifting visibility,
supporting causes “behind the scenes” rather than as
named spokespersons. This is consistent with the broader
finding that GBVO produces anticipatory self-censorship
even without new incidents, because women are constantly weighing uncertain protection against predictable
social costs.
Visibility management
(harm reduction rather than silence)
– Reducing posting frequency; avoiding public
comment sections; not appearing as a speaker on
high-traffic pages
– Moving from public content to private/closed groups
or limited audiences
– Temporarily “going quiet” until the trend/pile-on passes
2. Account and privacy protection
(digital safety behaviors)
– Tightening privacy settings; limiting who can
message/tag; restricting profile visibility
– Changing passwords, enabling additional security
steps, avoiding suspicious links
– Separating personal and public accounts; reducing
identifiable information online
3. Social and institutional buffering
(seeking protection through networks)
– Relying on trusted peer networks for advice,
documentation, emotional support
– Consulting media/CSO actors who provide guidance
or support to survivors
– Informal reporting/flagging through contacts rather
than formal channels (because formal reporting is
perceived as risky)
The legal environment further complicates reporting.
While cybercrime legislation exists, it is widely critiqued
by digital rights organizations as overly broad and susceptible to misuse in ways that suppress online expression.
For example, analysis of Syria’s Cybercrime Law No. 20 of
2022 emphasizes that expanded definitions can criminalize a wide range of online content and enable enforcement discretion that discourages people from engaging
authorities, especially where trust is already low (Fatafta,
2023; STJ, 2022). This is significant for GBVO because
survivors may fear that approaching official systems will
expose them to scrutiny, retaliation, or moral judgment,
particularly in cases involving intimate images, private
communication, or politically sensitive speech. “… the legal
procedure is unclear and there is no privacy for women.”
(Legal KII).
4. Psychosocial coping
(managing stress and fear)
– Seeking psychosocial support where available;
disengaging to reduce anxiety symptoms
– Self-monitoring and boundary-setting to prevent
re-triggering and escalation
Institutional capacity constraints also shape outcomes.
Even where relevant units exist, cybercrime is often deprioritized relative to other security and governance pressures. Furthermore, technical investigative capacity (digital
forensics, evidence preservation, chain-of-custody procedures) is limited. The result is a weak deterrence environment: perpetrators expect minimal consequences, while
survivors expect minimal protection. This expectation
becomes self-reinforcing: low reporting produces limited
caseload visibility, which contributes to low prioritization
and underinvestment, which further reduces trust.
4.7.1 Survivor experiences with reporting
Across IDIs, KIIs, and FGDs, reporting was described as
selective and often informal, rather than a routine step
after GBVO. Most commonly, participants described
self-managed responses (blocking, tightening privacy,
deleting comments, pausing activity) and limited disclosure to trusted people, while formal reporting, to platforms
or authorities, was depicted as uncertain, risky, or
ineffective.
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