Recommendations
1. Social media platforms (Facebook, TikTok, X)
● Develop and implement context‑sensitive moderation pathways for gendered hate speech
and sexualized disinformation targeting women in politics, with robust coverage of Iraqi
Arabic and Kurdish dialects and clear escalation channels for candidates and public figures.
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Platforms should ensure the deployment of human Arabic and Kurdish language moderators
with contextual knowledge of the region. In addition, they should reconfigure their
algorithms to reduce the amplification of dehumanizing language and harmful content that
targets individuals or groups.
Introduce verified “candidate” or “election actor” labels with fast‑track reporting tools for
impersonation, deepfakes, and manipulated content involving women candidates, with
expedited review during election periods.
● Expand structured partnerships with local fact‑checking and digital‑rights organizations to flag
and downrank content that recycles old material, misattributes videos, or relies on
insinuation‑based sexualized rumours against women candidates. And ensure rapid removal
of flagged content before it escalates or becomes harmful
● Formalize cooperation frameworks with electoral authorities and cyber‑crime units (federal
and KRG) so that coordinated harassment, AI‑generated sexualised content, and
honour‑based slander against women in politics trigger rapid removal and, where
appropriate, referral to law‑enforcement.
2. Government and electoral bodies
● Develop and publicize electoral regulations and sanctions that explicitly address TFGBV,
deepfakes, and smear campaigns against candidates, with defined complaints mechanisms,
evidentiary standards, and enforcement timelines. Also strengthen electoral integrity and
legal frameworks including establishing a monitoring unit in IHEC who can work with civil
society and digital rights orgs
● Create an election‑time rapid response unit that coordinates between the electoral
commission, cyber‑crime units, security agencies, and social media companies to monitor
high‑impact online violations, especially those targeting women candidates or escalating into
offline threats and forced withdrawals.
● Institutionalize existing cyber‑protection mechanisms for female candidates at the national
level and extend them formally to the KRI, ensuring Kurdish and Arab women candidates
benefit from the same reporting channels, technical support, and referrals.
● Adjust quota design and party‑list regulations to discourage symbolic or instrumental
nomination of women, for example by linking public funding or incentives to demonstrable
internal party support, fair competition practices, and leadership opportunities for women.
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