4. Findings
4.3.2 Perpetrator profiles, motivations,
and structural role
FGDs further highlighted that perpetrators range from
anonymous individuals to coordinated networks:
Some attacks are organized, not spontaneous.
FGD — Media actors
Perpetrators are motivated not only by disagreement, but
by an intent to discipline and deter women’s participation
in public discourse and by the perceived absence of
consequences. This is reflected in the way KIIs and survivor IDIs describe attacks that aim to silence, discredit, or
pressure women out of public visibility, alongside cases
where perpetrators act opportunistically because they
expect no accountability.
Among the most significant driving factors are
the absence of legal deterrents and differing
political or sectarian ideological opinions.
KII — Media professional
The consistent targeting of women journalists, activists,
and civil society actors highlights that GBVO is closely
linked to visibility, influence, and perceived authority,
rather than individual behavior. In multiple IDIs, women
explained that once they became identifiable (name, face,
public role, affiliation), abuse intensified regardless of the
specific content, suggesting that visibility itself is treated
as a challenge to norms around who is “entitled” to speak,
lead, or shape narratives.
The presence of both anonymous perpetrators and coordinated networks suggests that GBVO operates across
a spectrum, from opportunistic harassment to organized
intimidation. In the matrix, this spectrum is reflected in (a)
survivor accounts describing attacks by anonymous or
fake profiles that quickly “pile on” once a woman is visible,
and (b) journalist and media accounts describing patterns
that appear coordinated, repeated messaging, cross-page
amplification, and attacks linked to political/sectarian
polarization, particularly when content touches contested
public issues. Coordinated attacks indicate a strategic
dimension, where online violence is used deliberately to
silence women, undermine credibility, or deter participation.
These findings position perpetrators not merely as individuals expressing hostility, but as actors, sometimes loosely
organized, who contribute to maintaining gendered power
relations. GBVO thus becomes a tool for enforcing informal
rules about women’s participation in public life, especially
in politically sensitive or contested spaces, where IDIs
describe intimidation as a way to punish dissent, and FGDs
describe attacks as a predictable reaction to women’s
public visibility.
The data suggests that “perpetrators” are best understood
as a spectrum of actors operating in different degrees of
organization and intent, rather than a single profile. At one
end are opportunistic individuals who exploit visibility
and platform anonymity to insult, sexualize, or intimidate
women in public threads, often joining attacks once they
see others doing so. Survivors repeatedly describe this
as a high-volume pattern enabled by anonymity and the
social normalization of harassment; the interviewees
attributed these types of actions due to “psychological
disorders” and “the need to feel in control”. This “pile-on”
behavior is significant because it converts a targeted
incident into a social event, where participation in abuse
becomes normalized and even rewarded through engagement. Global research on online violence against women
journalists similarly finds that unknown or anonymous
sources constitute a major share of attackers, contributing to an environment where accountability is difficult and
responses are limited (Posetti et al., 2020).
A second category involves perpetrators linked to
interpersonal relationships (including acquaintances,
ex-partners, or family-connected networks), where online
harm is used as an extension of offline control, coercion, or
retaliation. This is evidenced in survivor IDIs and FGDs that
identify socially proximate perpetrators (e.g., people connected through family or prior relationships) and describe
motivations such as revenge and deliberate harm. In these
cases, the perpetrator’s access to personal information,
photographs, or social circles increases risk, particularly
when “family honor” narratives are activated. Survivors’
emphasis on reputation and private threats aligns strongly
with this dynamic: the harm is not only what is said online,
but what the content could trigger offline.
A third category includes financially motivated cyber
extortionists, who use threats of exposure, especially
image-based exposure, to demand money, services,
or compliance. Survivors described attempts to obtain
incriminating material to enable blackmail, including for
financial reasons, and KIIs described economic gain as
a primary driver for some perpetrators. Evidence from
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